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NOTES
FEDERAL PREEMPTION PREVENTS STATES FROM
INTERFERING WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENT
AIRPORT PROPRIETOR

NOISE POLLUTION-Aircraft Noise: The proprietary exception to
federal preeemption in the area of airport noise carved out by City
of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 623 (1973), also
prevents a state from interfering with local governments acting as
an airport proprietor. San Diego United Port District v. Gianturco,

651 F.2d 1306 (1981).
FACTS
The San Diego Unified Port District (Port District) owns and operates
San Diego International Airport, Lindbergh Field. The Port District imposed a midnight to 6:00 a.m. curfew on all commercial jet takeoffs. The
State of California, through its Department of Transportation, CalTrans,
imposed a more restrictive curfew. The Port District sought a variance
to the more restrictive regulation. An administrative law judge granted
the variance, subject to several conditions.' One condition required the
Port District to extend its curfew two hours, one hour on each end. The
Port District did not wish to extend its curfew further, and appealed the
judge's ruling in federal court, seeking an injunction. 2 The Port District
asserted that the state was preempted by federal law from interfering with
the District's regulation of its airport. The injunction was granted and an
appeal followed. The appellate court ruled on the issue of whether the
doctrine of federal preemption prevents the State of California from directing a political subdivision to impose a curfew on aircraft flights. In
so doing, the appellate court interpreted City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal,3 and federal statutes enacted since Burbank. The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court and held that the
state could not impose its own curfew regulations.
BACKGROUND
Air travel is the fastest method of transportation over long distances.
Airplanes, particularly the larger ones, generate significant and sometimes
unbearable amounts of noise. The problem represents a conflict between
two groups or interests. "On the one hand, there is a group who provide
I. San Diego Unified Port District v. Gianturco, 651 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir. 1981).
2. San Diego Unified Port District v. Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Cal. 1978).
3. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
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various air transportation services. On the other hand, there is a group
who live, work, and go to schools and churches in communities near
airports." 4 San Diego has struck a compromise between the two, which
the State of California does not feel is strong enough.
The conflict between San Diego and California, although unique because of the position of the parties, is representative of an ongoing discussion in the area of aircraft noise. Typically, two legal issues permeate
any discussion of aircraft noise: liability and preemption. The issue of
liability is settled. Airport proprietors are liable to nearby property owners
for property damage caused by aircraft noise from overflying commercial
flights.' Local governmental proprietors have responded to this dilemma
by attempting to control aircraft traffic, thereby controlling aircraft noise.
This raises the second legal issue, preemption.
In many areas of federal regulation the acts of Congress are so comprehensive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room
for supplemental state action. However, federal statutes and policy clearly
indicate that cooperative state-federal regulation of noise control is envisioned by Congress. This shared power is to be exercised by local
governments under restrictions imposed by Congress. There is no express
statutory provision for federal preemption in this area. Neither the Federal
Aviation Act, 6 nor the Noise Control Act of 1972, 7 explicitly prohibits
state and local governments from acting in this area. The preemption that
does exist in this area has been judicially created.
Prior to the Noise Control Act of 1972, a series of cases arose involving
local governments grappling with the question of the extent of their
authority to regulate aircraft noise. The courts held federal authority
preempted local regulations which affect aircraft flight. 8 In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 9 the City of Burbank attempted to
impose curfew restrictions on the Hollywood-Burbank Airport. Burbank
enacted a curfew ordinance which made unlawful jet take-offs from Hollywood-Burbank Airport between 11 p.m and 7 a.m. The Court ruled
that the City was preempted from exercising its police powers over aircraft
serving the airport. However, the Court noted in a footnote that it did
4. H.R. 1463, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1968).
5. This issue was settled first in Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962). The Supreme
Court has never wavered from this position. It is now well established law; law which exposes
airport owners, overwhelmingly local governments, to a plethora of lawsuits.
6. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§4901-18 (Supp. III 1973).
8. Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 132 F. Supp. 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 238
F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956); City of Newark v. Eastern Airlines, 159 F. Supp. 750 (D.N.J. 1958);
American Airlines v. Town of Hempstead, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1017 (1969).
9. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
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not consider "what limits, if any, apply to a municipality as a proprietor"
in the area of aircraft noise regulation. 0 Hence, although Burbank supported the proposition that local governments were preempted from exercising any direct control over aircraft noise, the holding did not apply
to those cities which owned and operated their own airports. Because the
liability of cities which owned their airports was well established," it
was recognized that some measure of protective power needed to be
extended to them. In suits subsequent to Burbank, courts have acknowledged the right of local governmental proprietors to enact noise control
ordinances. 12
GIANTURCO
Generally, challenges to aircraft noise control ordinances arise in the
context of a private party contesting the local governmental proprietor's
power to enact restrictive ordinances. In San Diego Unified Port District
v. Gianturco,3 the challenge comes from the State of California against
one of its political subdivisions, the Port District. Hence, the posture of
the parties is somewhat reversed. In this case, the Port District (rather
than a private party) is arguing that the state (rather than a local government) is preempted from interfering with the District's control over its
airport. Unwilling to extend its curfew, the Port District petitioned the
district court to enjoin enforcement of the state's more restrictive conditions. The district court agreed with the Port District's assessment of
the relative position of the parties and held that the state was preempted
by federal authority. Pursuant to this finding, the court issued a preliminary
injunction. 14
On appeal, the state argued that the district court erred in relying on
Burbank and issuing the injunction. The Port District reiterated its argument that the State of California was preempted from interfering with
the District's control over its airport.
In addressing itself to the arguments of the parties, the Ninth Circuit
court begins with an exploration into preemption. The court's analysis
of preemption follows traditional lines. Noting that Congress had not
enacted laws explicitly preempting states in the area of aircraft noise, the
court determined that the "key to the scope of federal preemption is the
10. Id. at 635 n. 14 (1973).
11.See cases cited supra in footnote 8.
12. National Aviation v. City of Hayward, 418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Air Transport
Ass'n of America v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Santa Monica Airport Ass'n v. City
of Santa Monica, 659 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1981). See also 22 NAT. RES. J. 251 (1982) for further
discussion.
13. 651 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1981).
14. Id. at 1309.
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intent of Congress in enacting the applicable federal legislation." 5 Because the court found no specific intent on the part of Congress to preempt
local government in this area, it proceeded to analyze case law on the
subject of preemption.
Case law in this area traditionally requires the court to first assess the
effect of state regulation on national aviation and aircraft noise policy.
In this instance the court finds no problem in determining that the State
of California is seeking "to regulate and restrict aircraft flights directly
by requiring the Port District to adopt a more extensive curfew than the
Port District itself thought necessary and appropriate." 6 The problem,
the court states, is in assessing the effect of the state's action on national
aviation and aircraft noise policy.
The court begins with a Burbank type analysis, and reaffirms the district
court's finding that the Port District is well within the exemption to federal
preemption of local control of air traffic created by footnote 14. " This
portion of the Gianturco opinion, the examination of Congressional intent
and applicable case law, is well reasoned and on firm legal footing. The
court holds that the State of California is in a position analogous to that
of the City of Burbank. That is, it is a "governmental entity .. .attempting to impose a mandatory curfew on an unwilling airport proprietor."' 8
The state responded with a two pronged argument. First, the state
asserted Burbank was no longer good law because of congressional and
administrative actions evincing a retreat from that position. This prompted
the court to analyze applicable federal rules and regulations enacted since
Burbank. Second, the state argued that even if Burbank was good law,
the State of California fits into the exemption Burbank created. This led
the court back to a complete and somewhat faulty analysis of Burbank.
a. FederalRegulation Following Burbank
Part of the state's first argument is that the Quiet Communities Act of
1978 (QCA) 9 amended the 1972 Noise Control Act relied upon in Burbank. Specifically, the State of California quotes section two of the QCA,
and argues that local governments are allowed to regulate the source of
aviation noise unless such regulation is in direct conflict with existing
federal regulations. The court correctly rebuffs the state's argument, but
later contradicts itself on this point. Although correct in its refutation of
15. Id. at 1310.
16. Id. at 1311.
17. For a complete discussion of the impact of the proprietary exemption created by footnote 14
inBurbank, see 58 Neb. L. Rev. 494 (1979), 18 Va. J. Int'l L. 569 (1978), and 8 Transp. L. J.
403 (1976).
18. 651 F.2d at 1312.
19. Codified in42 U.S.C. §4905, 4910, 4913, 4918, 6901, 6903, 6907, 6913, 6922, 6923,
1979).
6925, 6947, 6961, 6962, 6964, 6972, 6973, 6977, 6981-84 and 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (Supp.III
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California's argument, the court incorrectly reasons that the distinction
is between controlling the source of the noise and mitigating its impact.
The court states that "federal authority preempted local control of the
sources of aviation noise.-20
Distorting aircraft noise regulation ordinances imposed through curfews
into an attempted control of aircraft noise at its source severely handicapped the court's reasoning. Concluding that portion of its opinion, the
court egregiously states that "[olur analysis ... leads us to conclude
that the curfew imposed by [the State] impinges on airspace management
by directing when planes may fly in the San Diego area [cite omitted]
and a federal control of aircraft noise at its source by restricting the
permissible flight times ... solely on the basis of their noise." 2 The
Port District was doing the same thing as the state, to a lesser extent,
yet the court fails to realize that. If the court did not realize that, then it
internally overruled itself in its statement that the "state has attempted
to act in an area preempted by the federal government and its actions are
void. "22
b. The Burbank Analysis As Applied
In the second part of its argument, California argued that if Burbank
is still good law, the state qualifies as an airport proprietor and is therefore
exempt from federal preemption. Responding to the state's argument, the
court analyzes the criteria necessary to qualify as a proprietor within the
meaning of footnote 14 in Burbank. "These criteria (ownership, operation, promotion, and the ability to acquire necessary approach easements)
comprise a federal definition of proprietors for preemption purposes."23
Exploring the powers and authorities granted the Port District by the state,
the court arrives at the conclusion that the Port District is an airport
proprietor. The court notes that "[u]nder state law then, the Port District
is the owner, operator, and promoter of San Diego Airport." 24 Agreeing
to this, California argues that because of its inherent powers over its
political subdivisions, it too is a proprietor. Focusing on the liability
factor, the court soundly rejects this proposition. In its conclusion, the
court states that it is the Port District, not the state, which is subject to
suit from citizens. The court then holds that "[s]ince CalTrans bears no
liability for excessive aircraft noise at Lindbergh Field, it is not now a
proprietor under federal law, and cannot avail itself of City of Burbank's
footnote 14."25
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

651 F.2d at 1313.
Id. at 1316.
Id.
Id. at 1317.
Id.
Id.at 1319.
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CONCLUSION
While the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reaches the correct result,
the reasoning employed to rebuff that portion of the state's argument
based on the Quiet Communities Act is deficient. The state is barred from
regulating air traffic via a curfew at Lindbergh Field because that amounts
to impinging on airspace management and federal control of aircraft noise
at its source. These attempts are preempted because they conflict directly
with federal legislation. Yet that is exactly what the Port District is doing
with its curfew. The only distinction is that the District owns the airport.
Ownership of an airport by a governmental entity does not grant it immunity from direct federal regulations. It does, however, exempt it from
preemption based on a Burbank analysis and the application of Griggs
liability. Therefore, although its initial reasoning is somewhat faulty, the
conclusion the court reached is entirely correct. The result is that the
preemption exemption outlined in footnote 14 of Burbank is now further
strengthened to give local governments the right to make regulations in
this area without interference from their state governments.
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